CONTENTS

Introduction 9
Genocide as Social Death: A Comparative Conceptual Analysis 19
Nazism and Stalinism in the Light of Kierkegaard's Thought 39
Multiculturalism, Liberalism and Christianity: Some Elucidations (concerning Europe) 49
The Case of Slovenia from the Point of View of the Theory of Citizenship 75
References 95
Abstract 109
About the Author 110
INTRODUCTION

This book consists of four essays. At the beginning of this introduction let me quickly summarize their content. The first essay explains the concept of genocide by means of the concept of social death. Its central findings are the following: Genocide is an extreme form of social death. Intentional causing of social death is the central evil of genocide. Social death is what distinguishes genocide from mass killings. Physical killing of the members of the target groups is not essential for genocide. There are more sophisticated forms of genocide by which the members of the target groups are not killed physically, but there are rather destroyed “only” particular ties, relationships and social structures which are of vital importance for the survival of the target groups as such. The essay explains also what kind of groups are targets of genocide, the claim that genocide is an ethically laden concept, and some implications of this fact. On this basis it provides a comparative analysis of some phenomena closely connected with genocide: crime against humanity, totalitarianism, terrorism and ethnical cleansing. It reflects also upon the genocidal effects of military mass rapes. What is genocide is an important question. That’s why it is very important to sharpen our minds for the recognition of genocide, also by providing an adequate definition of it which is appropriately tested. The last is the main aim of this essay which owes a lot to the work of Claudia Card.

The general aim of the second essay is to contribute to the answer on the question how studying of Kierkegaard could help us to understand societal and political life. I illustrate Kierkegaard’s usefulness by example of an innovative and illuminative Bellinger’s interpretation of Nazism and Stalinism given in Kierkegaard’s terms of anxiety and stadia of existence. Bellinger interprets Hitler and Nazism as an extreme pathological example of the aesthetic stadium and anxiety before the good, and Stalinism as an extreme pathological example of the ethical stadium and anxiety before the evil. On this basis we may also speak about the importance of Kierkegaard for the understanding of depth motivation for political violence and crime.

The term multiculturalism bears many different meanings. The aim of the third essay, in which the influence of ideas of Larry Siedentop is evident, is to explain these different meanings. This is very important, as there are
both positive and negative connotations attached to the term *multiculturalism*; hence, some forms of multiculturalism should be supported and others rejected.

A substantial part of the essay is devoted to the consideration of the damaging effects of some forms of multiculturalism on the democracy in Europe and on the future of the EU, in general. The role of Christianity is explained in relation to this subject. I explain the concept of identity. Identity is what binds people together and what at the same time distinguishes us from the others. For the cultivation of European identity (which is liberal) the consciousness that liberalism is a secular child of Christianity is necessary.

A considerable part of the essay is dedicated to elucidation of the utilitarian attitude towards multiculturalism and its implications. There is a similarity between utilitarianism and a special form of multiculturalism (levelling multiculturalism): as for utilitarianism all wishes are of equal value so for the levelling multiculturalism all cultures are equivalent. I warn against the dangerous phenomenon of Christophobia in Europe (Weiler 2003). In Europe we can notice the avoiding of recognition of truth about our own identity. That means that we neglect not only the truth about ourselves, but also the truth about the others. But is this really necessary to cultivate tolerance, coexistence, cooperation, dialogue, solidarity etc. between different cultures? I don’t think so. True Christianity can be a foundation for tolerance towards others and for their respect. Therefore is Christophobia – which is based on the care for other, non-Christian cultures in Europe and when directed against genuine Christianity – unjustified.

In the last essay some general ideas and concepts of the theory of citizenship are introduced and presented and then applied to reflect on the specific situation in Slovenia. I pay great attention to three political virtues: civility, the capacity to object to the centres of power, and the virtue of public reason. The heart of the last is the capability of dialogue. In the contemporary Slovenian society those three central civic virtues are not sufficiently developed or cultivated. The essay is an attempt to contribute to the understanding of such condition by taking into account the Slovenian history. It focuses on the period from 1941 to 1990 (from the beginning of the occupation to the change of the regime (from the socialist one-party system to the liberal democracy)).
The reasons why I deal with the phenomena that are subjects of this book are various. Some are specific and some are of more general nature. The specific are connected with our Slovenian history and situation. In the WW II and after it Slovenia and Slovenians were subjected to Fascism, Nazism and Communism. There was a civil war and a lot of bloodshed. Genocide, totalitarianism, brutal violence, mass killings and other (related) crimes took place. In our small country – extended over only 20,000 km² – there is more than 600 hundred registered mass graveyards. In fact, long before 1941 Slovenes suffered under Fascism in Mussolini’s Italy. We may say that Slovenes were the first victims of Fascism and its “guinea pigs”. Slovene language was prohibited, Slovene children were extremely severely punished in schools because of its use, Slovenes were tortured and killed, their names were changed in Italian etc. Genocide started in its brutal and totally unhidden way. On July 13th 1920 the highly modern building of the Slovene national centre in Trieste was burnt down. Slovene writer Boris Pahor reports about his traumatic experience when he – as seven years old boy – observed Fascists dancing around the burning building like Indians. All this had happened twenty years before the WW II started. Immediately after the war extremely brutal and extensive mass killings happened in Slovenia in which tens of thousands of Slovenes and people of other nations were victims. After 1945 the decades of the Communist non-democratic regime followed. After the change of the regime no lustration at all was carried out, not even in its most limited extension and its mildest form.

The consequences – which are very present also in the present time – of such history are (uncured) traumas, psychological profiles and characters of many Slovenes which are unsuitable for free and democratic society, refusal to accept a truthful interpretation of the past, seriously damaged morality, lack of adequate work and business ethics, of democratic political culture, the positions of power occupied by non-democratically directed people who were part of the elite of the previous Communist regime (and by their “mentally” successors), and a strong polarization (cultural and political) of the Slovene society. The result is the crisis of the (contemporary) Slovene society and state – moral, economical and political.

Taking into account such situation it is not surprising that my colleagues and I are interested in topics like genocide, totalitarianism, terror, political crime, mass killings etc. and the ways of their preventing and over-
Introduction

coming of their effects. Among the last reconciliation, forgiveness, empathy, dialogue, solidarity and proper ethics of memory are especially worth to mention. All these topics are subject of intense research of me and my colleagues in the last decade (and even before). Our multidisciplinary research programs and projects are devoted to their investigation. A part of those investigations is published in this book. But these phenomena are of course not interesting only from the Slovenian point of view. There is no part and period of the human world which is not marked by genocide. Totalitarianism is far from being only Slovenian problem. Besides that – when we deal with such an extreme forms of evil like genocide and totalitarianism – a lot of things appear in much clearer way because they are not covered by usual compromises and concessions. They enable us to observe, intuit and recognize the essence of (evil) things in their “purest” form which is of immense value for philosophy, anthropology, ethics and other areas of knowledge.

All genocides are in this or in other form a kind of culturocide. So the question of proper relationship between different cultures is already from this point of view of big importance. Beside that modern world is globalized also in the cultural sense. Cultural heterogeneity is a fact in Europe and finding of the right attitude to this situation is one of the central European challenges. So, strong motivation for dealing with multiculturalism has many sources.

The view which I have named solidary personalism represents the background of all thinking in this book and the basic ethical measure. I explained it sufficiently in the essays in this book and in some my other texts so I won’t repeat its explanation here. I only want to say a word or two about its origins and foundations. Christian faith and (intellectual) tradition, works of Kierkegaard, Franz Brentano, Emmanuel Mounier, Hannah Arendt, but also of Nikolay Berdiaev, Martin Buber, France Veber, Milan Komar, Eric Voegelin, Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, Martha Nussbaum, Luce Irigaray, Martin Heidegger, Hubert Dreyfus, Emmanuel Lévinas, Zygmunt Bauman, Will Kymlicka, Wittgenstein and some parts of analytical philosophy are among its main origins, examples and inspirations.

This book is a philosophical book. I think that philosophy has two central and fundamental aims:
Introduction

a) Introducing of new concepts and conceptual distinctions – without which our thinking is inferior and blind for sometimes even fatally important differences – and their fruitful application.

b) Checking, testing, controlling etc. of the correctness and grounds of our thinking.

These two tasks are mutually dependent because often you can prove that one’s thinking is not correct or grounded only by introducing of certain (new) concepts or conceptual distinctions or by their fruitful application. I use this method also in the present book.

Let me explain my understanding of the job of a philosopher by a simple short story. One day a friend of my wife came to visit us. I started a conversation with her and she told me that there is a problem about which she wants to discuss with me. It was the following. She lives with her husband and her son in a really big house in the capital of our country where she works and her son is studying. Her son is twenty five years old. One day he came to her and let her know that he would move out of the house and would live alone – as a lessee – in a small bed-sitting-room. When she asked him what was the reason the answer was that he had enough of her control. This answer has really upset and affected her. She asked me what I thought. Is she really so possessive? Does she really interfere too much in his life? My answer was the following: I don’t know neither you nor your son nor your relationship and your situation well enough to judge whether he is right or not. I am neither a priest nor your family psychoanalyst or psychotherapist. But I am a philosopher and I can help you and your son in a philosophical way to conceptualize your situation and to perform a dialogue on the problem.

I said to her that she should make some conceptual distinctions. The first is between control at one side and parental care on the other. The last is something good and it is parent’s obligation to perform. On the other hand the first means managing the life of some other person instead of that person herself. As such it is something bad and a healthy person should resist it. An individual lives as a person in the full sense of the world only when she herself runs her life and not when it is ruled by somebody else. Otherwise her life is essentially impoverished. In such case she is in the substantial way not free. Of course a fully realized person who is not free is a contradictio in adiecto. A healthy personality
should therefore resist and avoid any situation in which somebody else runs her life instead of her.

We may further make an additional distinction between supervision and control. In the case of supervision we oversee the situation but we don’t interfere (though we can when needed). So for instance we can supervise traffic but we don’t interfere in it.

Then I gave the following advice to my wife’s friend: Use these concepts and conceptual distinctions and reflect the situation, your relationship with your son, your attitude toward him and your actions etc. Try to find out what actually they are: a control, supervision or just parental care. Your son should do a similar reflection. Afterwards you two should meet and discus, exchange and even argue in a dialogical way what you have found out.

She was pleasantly surprised by my – as she said – very original sugges-
tion and she “promised” me to do that. I don’t know how the story devel-
oped further because I haven’t met her since then.

This story in a simple way illustrates what is according to my opinion the fundamental task of philosophy – the conceptual equipment or enrich-
ment of our thinking. This includes an analysis of concepts, introduction
of new concepts and conceptual distinctions without which our thinking
is inferior and (might be even fatally) blind for important distinctions.
The aim of philosophy is also to provide an explicit understanding or
definition of concepts as possible.

Let us illustrate this by a concrete example of genocide. An explicit un-
derstanding and definition of genocide is important in order to know
whether we deal with genocide or not and for better understanding of its
relationship to some other related phenomena belonging to other con-
cepts: war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnical cleansing, terrorism,
totalitarianism, mass killings, mass (and systematic) sexual violence, etc.
For that reason we must try to discern the concept of genocide from those
concepts.

So the major part of the philosophical consideration of genocide is con-
ceptual analysis of it and of relevant conceptual distinctions. These dis-
tinctions importantly enrich and enlighten our discussion. A debate with-
out knowledge about those distinctions and their taking into account is
necessary inferior. They enable us to see the important aspects of geno-
cide which otherwise remain hidden, and nonetheless to recognize genocidal phenomena (as genocidal).

The fundamental method of the philosophy of genocide is therefore a (comparative) analysis of the concept of genocide. We can use also relevant (contemporary) literature on genocide and test findings and hypotheses in the light of concrete historical and contemporary phenomena. Of course we must take into account also legal texts which deal with the concept of genocide and other relevant concepts. But – on the other hand – exactly lawyers need philosophical elucidation of genocide in order to be able to better formulate their documents and do better job in general.

There are two essential moments of totalitarianism: ideology and violence. There is an analogous mistake we may commit by analyzing and defining totalitarianism and genocide. As I show in this book it is important that by definition of genocide we don’t limit ourselves only to physical death. The essential moment of genocide is not physical death but rather social death. Physical death is only one (extreme) way to carry out social death. If we define genocide only by physical death then our definition doesn’t cover some clear cases of genocide. We can notice a similar situation in the case of totalitarianism. If we limit our definition of totalitarianism only to the so-called atrocious violence (or terror) (concentration camps, mass killings and arrests, physical torturing etc.) our definition leaves out some important (actual) cases of totalitarian regimes. The essence of totalitarianism is not only atrocious violence. Totalitarian aims can be reached also by “milder” forms of violence. The essential aim of totalitarian violence is to destroy persons as persons, to destroy people’s autonomy, spontaneity, moral sense, responsiveness etc. Exactly such destruction of persons is the true nature of (totalitarian) violence. In essence it doesn’t matter in what way it is achieved or tried to achieve: by atrocious violence, by propaganda, by advertising, by means of pills or some other chemical means; just as in the case of genocide it doesn’t matter whether social death is achieved by way of physical death or in some other way.

On this ground we may explain the difference between totalitarian and post-totalitarian systems: while post-totalitarian systems are still totalitarian, the prevailing form of violence is non-atrocious, instead of atrocious. According to these definitions some regimes are not totalitarian in narrow sense of the word but they are still totalitarian in the sense of post-totalitarianism (Havel 1985; Killingsworth 2012). The examples of such
post-totalitarian regimes are Communist states (in some of their periods) like Poland, DDR (Killingsworth, *op. cit.*) and Tito’s Yugoslavia after 1950.

These examples nicely illustrate the importance of proper analysis and understanding of our concepts and hence of philosophy. If we are mistaken at conceptual level then we are mistaken on a very basic level and the consequences might be very serious. If we understand some concepts too narrowly some phenomena remain – in our thought – disconnected although they demand a common concept in order that our reflexion on them is adequate, fruitful and illuminating on one hand and not hiding or even leading astray. Our reflexion can increase our knowledge only if our concepts are adequate. In the opposite case it can seriously block it up and lead to mistakes.

Another general feature of totalitarian systems and genocides which we can discern from this book is that genocide, totalitarianism and even levelling multiculturalism are fundamentally anti-Christian phenomena. Maybe in the clearest way this is revealed by Kierkegaardian analysis of Stalinism and Nazism. This finding makes our book very compatible not only with Kierkegaardian, Weiler’s and Siedentop’s accounts that are explicitly used in this book, but also with such monumental narratives like Eric Voegelin’s one or views of Pope John Paul II (2005) to mention just two distinguished examples. So for instance, according to Voegelin (1987) gnosticism – pace him modern totalitarianisms are just the extreme exemplifications of gnosticism – has two essential characteristics: immanentization and anti-Christianity. All these views converge to the finding that cultivation of the central elements of Christian anthropology, epistemology and ethics is of crucial importance for genuine liberal, humane and democratic society – in our modern, Western sense of these worlds – and that the negation or repudiation of Christianity is certainly not the right way to achieve this goal.

This book is just another small contribution to fortifying of this view. The first Vogelin’s characteristic of gnosticism which was mentioned above – immanentization or elimination of transcendence – leads us to the fundamental bulwark against instrumentalism – and *eo ipso* against genocide and totalitarianism – the recognition of the transcendent nature of the world, persons, and human history. Recognition of transcendence is maybe not a sufficient condition to prevent extreme instrumentalist evils like genocide and totalitarianism but it is certainly actually necessary for
not opening clear and wide road to them. At the bottom of depersonalization (both of a victim an of a perpetrator) which is described by authors like Arendt and Bauman, as the crucial element of genocides, totalitarianism, radical evil etc., lies the “elimination” of the transcendence of human person, its refusal or its negation. Or, as Luce Irigaray (2004, 8) wrote: without recognition of other’s transcendence in flesh and spirit a true recognition of the other as the other is not possible. Recognition of one as a transcendent being and recognition of him/her as a person goes hand in hand. This principle sets a limit also to solidarity. We must strive for solidarity among persons (understood as mutual participation at their lives). Yet in this striving we should never forget that total participation is impossible. As soon as we forget this, our true recognition of the other as the other, as a person and the respect of his/her dignity is seriously endangered if not already destructed. Solidarity and transcendence of every person are the essential moment of solidary personalism. Therefore we may conclude that totalitarianism, genocide and also levelling multiculturalism represent the (extreme) violations of the ethics of solidary personalism.

At the end I would like to say few words about the level at which I deal with the topics in this book. This level is fundamental. If we analyse the conditions and factors – positive and negative – of genocide and totalitarianism there are many, various and at several levels. I limited myself to point to only some of them. The criterion was that they are fundamental enough to “deserve” philosophical attention. So this book tries to contribute to better conceptual understanding of the considered phenomena and to throw some light upon really fundamental origins, conditions and factors of totalitarianism, genocide and (harmful) multiculturalism.